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Taking Threats Seriously: Section 264.1 and Threats as a form of Domestic Violence 
-by- 
Joanna Birenbaum 
Isabel Grant 
1. Introduction 
An alarming number of women are in abusive relationships where violence and threats of 
violence pervade their lives.1 While the rate of homicide has declined in Canada in recent years, 
the rate of spousal homicide2 has remained stable since 2004,3 with the overwhelming majority 
of victims being women.4  In Canada, a woman is killed by her intimate partner or former 
intimate partner every six days.5  Women report more serious episodes of violence6 and are more 
likely than men to be exposed to multiple incidents of violence.7  
 
                                                 
Joanna Birenbaum, Toronto-based lawyer and former Legal Director of the Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund.  Isabel Grant, Professor, Faculty of Law at Allard Hall, UBC. We would like to thank Christine Boyle, Kent 
Roach and Elizabeth Sheehy for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Laura DeVries, Laura Johnston, Karen 
Segal and Brendan Ward for their research assistance on this paper.   
1
 In 2004, for example, roughly 653,000 women living in common-law or marital relationships indicated that they 
had been physically or sexually assaulted by a partner at least once during the previous five years, which constitutes 
approximately 7% of this population. Higher rates of violence are reported by women who have separated from their 
spouses. In 2004, 21% of these women reported violence in the previous five years. Statistics Canada, Measuring 
Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends 2006 (Ottawa: StatCan, 2 October 2006) at 17-18  [Measuring Violence 
Against Women].  
2
 The term spouse here includes common law spouses and former spouses. 
3
 Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, 2011, (Ottawa: StatCan 2011) at 8 [Family 
Violence]. While this Report is more recent than the Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1, it is also 
written in gender neutral terms and fails to account for the unique characteristics of male violence against women.   
4
 Between 1974 and 2004, 2178 women were killed in Canada by their male intimate or former intimate partners. 
This accounts for 77% of all intimate homicides (Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1 at 25). 
Aboriginal women are particularly vulnerable to spousal homicide with a rate eight times higher than that of non-
aboriginal women(Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1 at 67). 
5
 This figure was arrived at from data presented in Statistics Canada, Juristat, Homicide in Canada, 2010 by T 
Mahoney (Ottawa: StatCan 26 October 2011) at 11, 12 and Statistics Canada, 2011 (Ottawa: StatCan 2011) at 37-
38. 
6
 For example, in 2009, women were three times more likely to report they had been “sexually assaulted, beaten, 
choked or threatened with a gun or a knife by their partner or ex-partner in the previous 5 years”. Family Violence, 
supra note 3 at 10; Molly Dragiewicz & Yvonne Lindgren, “The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical 
Data for Lawyers Considering Equal Protection Analysis” (2009) 17 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 229. 
7
 Family Violence, supra note 3 at 11; Department of Justice, Spousal Abuse: A Fact Sheet from the Department of 
Justice Canada, (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2001) [Spousal Abuse Fact Sheet].  In “Why Women Stay: A 
Theoretical examination of rational choice and moral reasoning in the context of intimate partner violence” (2012) 
45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 179 at 179-180, Silke Meyer cites various studies as follows: 
“Findings from international victim surveys show that IPV affects one in three adult women in most industrialized 
nations, is a leading cause of injuries to women of reproductive age and is associated with 60% of homicides 
involving a female victim”.   
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The criminal justice response to domestic abuse of women has historically focused on discrete 
acts of physical violence.8    There is increasing recognition, however, that woman abuse is a 
“course of conduct crime”9 in which episodic physical violence is only one mechanism of 
subjugation of women by abusive men.  Overt and subtle threats of violence, as well as 
emotional and psychological abuse, threats to take custody of children, financial control, and 
isolation of women from family, friends, employment and other networks of support, create a 
continuum of terror by which abusive men dominate and control their female partners.    Threats 
are often used to prevent women from leaving a relationship (if you leave I will kill you or your 
child), to isolate women from other people in their lives (you’ll “get it” if you visit your family 
or friends), to prevent women from reaching out to police and social services (don’t you dare call 
police, or if you call the police, you will pay), and to keep women in a constant state of 
uncertainty and fear. The Ontario Court of Appeal recognized this fact in R v Bates: 
 
Crimes involving abuse in domestic relationships are particularly heinous because they 
are not isolated events in the life of the victim. Rather, the victim is often subjected not 
only to continuing abuse, both physical and emotional, but also experiences perpetual 
fear of the offender.10 
 
This article examines the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision in R v O’Brien11 which is currently 
under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.12 In O’Brien, the accused threated to kill his 
                                                 
8
 This is probably true of the criminal justice system generally, which does not respond well to the crimes that occur 
in the context of ongoing relationships.  See e.g. Tamara L Kuennen, “Private Relationships and Public Problems: 
Applying Principles of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence” (2010) 2 Brigham Young University LR 
515; Evan Stark, Coercive Control: The Entrapment of Women in Personal Life (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) [Stark, Coercive Control]. More generally, see Mark Kelman, “Interpretive Construction in the  
Substantive  Criminal Law" (1981) 33 Stanford LR 591, who discusses this tendency of the criminal law to focus on 
the narrow time frame of the acts in question.  
9
 Stark, Coercive Control, ibid at 379; see also Evan Stark, “Commentary on Johnson’s “Conflict and Control:  
Gender Symmetry and Assymetry in Domestic Violence” (2006) 12:11 Violence Against Women 1019 [Stark, 
“Commentary on Johnson”] at 1019-21. 
10
 R v Bates, [2000] OJ No 2558, 134 OAC 156. 
11
 R v O’Brien, 2012 MBCA 6 [CA Judgment]. 
12
 The case will be heard on 6 December 2012. 
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intimate partner when she told him she was going to have an abortion. After a brief summary of 
O’Brien, our analysis will make two central points.  First, we argue that in intimate relationships, 
threats of death and bodily harm are a form of domestic violence, often used by men in concert 
with physical violence and other forms of intimidation to control and dominate women.  The 
Canadian criminal justice response to charges of uttering threats in intimate partner relationships 
must fully account for the cumulative, ongoing and dynamic nature of abuse, as well as abused 
women’s complex and varied responses to abuse.  Second, we examine the history of s.264.1 of 
the Criminal Code and the case law to argue that the courts in O’Brien have applied the elements 
of the offence improperly and in a manner that is inconsistent with the statutory language and 
legislative intent. In so doing, the judgments incorrectly burden abused women with testifying to 
their fear in response to threats by their abusers, despite the fact that such evidence is 
unnecessary to prove the offence.  This error of law reflects the continued privatization of 
domestic abuse and violence against women more generally.   The idea that male violence 
against women is a private intimate matter between the couple in which the state should be 
hesitant to intervene has historically hindered state responses to domestic violence.13 Further, 
compelling abused women to testify to their fear risks exposing women to increased physical 
violence and threats and ignores the complex considerations which drive abused women’s 
decision to co-operate in the prosecution of their partners or to support their defence.14 
                                                 
13
 See Frances Olsen, “Constitutional law: Feminist critiques of the public/private distinction” (1993) Const 
Comment 319 at  6 for a review of literature demonstrating that domestic violence has historically not been 
vigorously prosecuted because it was seen as a “private” family matter.  See also Catherine Moore, “Women and 
Domestic Violence: The Public/Private Dichotomy in International Law” (2003) 7 International Journal of Human 
Rights 93; Jennifer Koshan, “Sounds of Silence: The Public/Private Dichotomy, Violence, and Aboriginal Women” 
in Susan Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1997) 87. 
14
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the complex arguments for and against “no drop” policies in the 
prosecution of domestic violence. For critiques of these policies see e.g. Kuennen, supra note 8. Kuennen criticizes 
no drop policies for failing to take into account the complex relational factors that go into a woman’s decision 
regarding prosecution. See also Lisa Mills, Insult to Injury:  Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse 
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 2. R v O’Brien 
At the time of the alleged offence, O’Brien was incarcerated for assault and uttering threats. His 
criminal record included convictions for uttering threats, assault and assault with a weapon 
against two former intimate partners.  O’Brien called his partner,15 AW, from a prison phone. 
During the call, she told him that she was pregnant and that she was scheduled to have an 
abortion.  The accused attempted to persuade her not to have an abortion. When she refused to 
accede to his request, the accused became increasingly angry and, among other statements, said 
the following to her: 
- I’m going to kill you, man. 
- I mean it, man.  Watch, man.  I’ll be, on the 25th, on the 25th you’re 
getting a bullet in your fucking head you fucking little whore, man, 
o.k.?  O.k..  And the guards just heard me so I’m probably going to get 
charged for that.  So I’m going to fucking kill you you little bitch 
when I get outta here man.  O.k., you fucking hear me?  You’re dead, 
you fucking whore.  I mean it man.  Watch your windows.  I’m going 
to shoot your windows out, bitch. 
 
- You’re going to fucking be dead when I get outta here if you fucking 
keep talking shit. 
 
- I fuckin’ mean it.  I’ll put a bullet right in your fuckin’ head, you 
fuckin’ little whore, man, don’t fuckin’ be stupid, man.  You kill my 
baby, I mean it, man.  Watch.  You’ll be..You won’t even get a chance 
to get skinny man.  You won’t even get a chance.  Watch man.  I 
fuckin’ mean it.  Who’s gonna stop me from killin’ you, man?  Who’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2003); Leigh Goodmark, A Troubled Marriage, Domestic Violence and the 
Legal System (New York:  New York University Press, 2012); Erin L. Han, “Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop 
Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases” (2003) 23 BC Third World LJ 159. A central part of 
these latter critiques is the concern with the denial of women’s autonomy and agency and the replication of male 
disempowerment and coercion of women by the state.  In contrast, proponents argue that no-drop policies work 
against longstanding justifications for inaction and create credible threats of prosecution for batterers.  See e.g. 
Angela Corsilles, “No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or 
Dangerous Solution?” (1994-1995) 63 Fordham L Rev 853; Kalyani Robbins, “No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic 
Violence: Just Good Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?”  (1999-2000) 52 Stan L Rev 205; and Cheryl Hanna, 
“No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions” (1996) 109 Harvard L 
Rev 1849. 
15
 It is not clear from the evidence whether O'Brien and AW were former or current intimate partners. 
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gonna stop me? 
 
- You’re telling me you’re gonna fuckin’ kill my kid and shit, I wanna 
talk to you.  I’m trying to fuckin’..I wanna fuckin’..Maybe that’s what 
it is is cuz I’m not calling you and shit man.  And because I beat you 
up and shit.16 
 
As the accused predicted, prison officials reported the conversation to the police and O’Brien 
was charged with two counts of uttering threats and two counts of breach of probation.  AW was 
compelled to testify by the Crown.17  She testified that she wasn’t “worried about it” and “that’s 
the way he normally talks”.18   On cross examination she agreed that she was “not personally 
scared” and that the accused “runs at the mouth a lot”, “says a bunch of garbage sometimes”, 
“says trash talk” and “was just being loud and belligerent…and that’s all it was”.19  She also 
testified that her fourth child, present in the courthouse during the trial, was the baby fathered by 
O’Brien.20 
 
The trial judge acquitted the accused on all counts on the basis that, while the actus reus of 
threatening had been established, the testimony of the complainant left her with a reasonable 
doubt that the accused had intended that his words be threatening or intimidating.  The trial judge 
conceded that objectively the words were concerning, given the context in which they were 
made, the tone of voice and the fact that they were repeated.  However, she put a great deal of 
                                                 
16
 R v O’Brien, 2012 MBCA 6 (Factum of the Appellant) at paras 8, 10; CA Judgment, supra note 11 at paras 6, 7. 
17
 AW’s testimony was extremely brief.  The Crown asked her where she lived; the number of children she had; 
confirmed that AW’s testimony was compelled; asked AW to identify herself and O’Brien as the voices on the 
recorded telephone call; asked whether AW knew why O’Brien had called on the day in question; confirmed that 
AW had said on the call that she wanted O’Brien “out of her life”; and asked how “being on the receiving end” of 
the threat  made AW “feel”.   The Crown did not follow up with any further questioning in response to AW’s 
testimony that she wasn’t “worried” about the threat. The transcript of the Crown’s direct examination is 
approximately 2 ¼ pages and the transcript of the cross examination by defence counsel is approximately 2 ½ pages 
long. Transcript of Proceedings, April 7, 2011 [“Trial Transcript”]. 
18
 Ibid at p 8, lines 28-32, p 9, lines 29-34 and p 10, lines 1-11; see also CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 11. 
19
 Ibid at p 9, lines 29-34, p 10, lines 1-11, p 11, lines 6-9; CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 11. 
20
 Ibid at p 9, lines 24-28. 
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weight on the fact that AW testified that she did not take them seriously. After finding that the 
actus reus was made out, the trial judge continued:  
   
So I have to consider the evidence of Ms. [W] when I consider the mental 
element or the mens rea. Normally the mens rea is taken from the words of 
the accused, absent any explanation from the accused, and as I pointed out 
at the outset you have chosen not to testify, as is your right. But the 
evidence in this case is somewhat unusual in the sense that Ms. [W] has 
told the court that she was not concerned about the threats, that you shoot 
your mouth off, if I can use the vernacular, that she did not want you 
charged, she did not take the threat seriously. And so it is incumbent, and 
the court is required, to consider the words in the context of the evidence of 
Ms. [W], and when I do so, despite the fact that I am actually quite 
concerned about the actus of the offence, the comments, the words, I must 
say that I do have a reasonable doubt about the mental element of the mens 
rea of the offence because of the evidence of Ms. [W], the fact she did not 
take them seriously, and as I pointed out at the outset it is incumbent upon 
the Crown to prove all elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt.21  
 
A divided Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.22  The majority agreed that the mens 
rea requires only that the “accused had the required subjective intent, being that he meant his 
words to intimidate or to be taken seriously” and that “it is clear that the test is not whether the 
person who is the subject of the words uttered by the accused felt threatened, as it is not 
necessary for the Crown to prove that the person even had knowledge of them”.23 The majority 
also held that where the subject of the alleged threats is aware of the threat, his or her evidence 
“is not to be ignored” and his or her testimony “forms part of the context within which the words 
were uttered and must be considered as part of the circumstances that will determine whether a 
reasonable person would find that the words were meant to intimidate or be taken seriously”.24  
 
                                                 
21
 CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 12. 
22
 Per Beard, MacInnes JJA, Steel JA dissenting. 
23
 CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 28. 
24
 Ibid at para 29, emphasis added. 
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The Crown had argued before the Manitoba Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred by 
ignoring the evidence and context of domestic violence. The majority dismissed these arguments 
for several reasons. It found there was insufficient evidence of domestic violence, as there was 
nothing on the record other than the accused’s admission in the phone call that he beat her up. 
The majority stated that on a fact specific review of this case, which is “very dependent on 
seeing and hearing [AW] testify,”25  AW was “taunting” the accused and her voice on the phone 
calls showed no hesitation or fear.26 The Court further held that “there was no evidence to 
suggest that [AW] was afraid of the accused, or that she was testifying as she did to protect 
herself or anyone else from future violence”.27  Finally, the Court also noted that the trial judge 
was an experienced judge who frequently heard cases of domestic violence and that she would 
“doubtless, have been alive to any concern as to whether [AW]’s evidence was, or could have 
been, affected by being the victim of domestic violence such that she was not expressing her true 
interpretation of the accused’s words”.28 
 
In her dissenting judgment, Steel JA held that the accused’s words were not ambiguous or 
careless; they were not spoken in jest, but were spoken seriously, with the accused himself 
acknowledging that criminal charges could result.29  She reasoned that whether or not AW 
provoked the accused, “the law does not sanction threats to kill as a method to convince a 
woman to carry a pregnancy to term”.30 She persuasively concluded that: 
                                                 
25
 Ibid at para 49. 
26
 Ibid at paras 5, 44. 
27
 Ibid at para 45. 
28
 Ibid at para 46. Our view, discussed below, is that even if A.W. had testified that she was afraid, that would not  
    have told us much about the accused’s intention; rather, it would have told us that the words were perceived as    
    threatening, which we argue goes to actus reus not mens rea. 
29
 Ibid at para 62. 
30
 Ibid at para 64. 
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… it does not matter if this particular accused is an individual with an explosive 
temper who often makes threats that are not then carried out.   The fact “[t]hat’s 
the way [the accused] normally talks” does not legitimate the threats.  It does not 
matter whether the accused intended to carry out his threats.  It does not matter 
if the recipient of those threats did not in fact feel intimidated.  If the accused 
intended to intimidate the complainant or instill fear in her when he uttered the 
threats, then he intended them to be taken seriously and should be sanctioned 
accordingly.31 
 
 
3.Analysis: 
i) Threats as  a form of domestic violence  
 
Threats of death or bodily harm in intimate relationships are a form of domestic violence against 
women.  The United Nations’ 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
defines domestic violence as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to 
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.32  
In Canada, numerous provincial domestic violence statutes include threatening within the 
definition of domestic violence.33  The prohibition against criminal harassment, which includes 
threatening behaviour as one of four forms of harassment, was added to the Criminal Code in 
199334 “as a specific response to violence against women, particularly to domestic violence 
                                                 
31
 Ibid at para 67. 
32
  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, GA Res 48/104, UNGAOR, Supp No 49 at 217, UN 
Doc A/48/49 (1993). Statistics Canada indicates that this definition has been widely accepted by the international 
community. Its study of domestic violence explicitly includes threats of violence as a form of physical violence.    
Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1 at 8-9. 
33
 Protection Against Family Violence Act, RSA 2000, c P-27, s 1(e)(ii); The Domestic Violence and Stalking Act, 
CCSM, c D93, s 2(1.1)(b); Protection Against Family Violence Act, SNWT 2003, c 24, s 2(b); Family Violence 
Protection Act, SNL 2005, c  F-3.1, s 3(1)(c); Domestic Violence Intervention Act, SNS 2001, c 29, s 5(1)(b),(e); 
Victims of Domestic Violence Act, SS 1994, c V-6.02, s 2(d)(ii); Victims of Family Violence Act, RSPEI 1988, c V-
3.2, s 2(2)(c), (e), (f);  Family Violence Protection Act, RSY 2002, c 84, s 1. 
34
 An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act, RS 1993, c 45 s 2.  See Criminal Code, RSC 
1985, c C-46, s 264. 
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against women”.35   Government of Canada and provincial government publications across the 
country include threats in their definitions or descriptions of intimate partner abuse.36  A federal 
Department of Justice Family Violence Initiative publication on “spousal abuse”, for example, 
recognizes that “there are many different forms of spousal abuse, and a person may be subjected 
to more than one form” and that spousal abuse includes “using criticism, verbal threats, social 
isolation, intimidation or exploitation to dominate another person”.37    
 
In cases involving intimate partners, the offence of uttering threats under s 264.1 of the Criminal 
Code must be understood in this context.   Threats of death and bodily harm in intimate 
relationships are often part of a constellation of behaviours which seek to control the choices and 
actions of the women involved.   Threats constitute a form of abuse in a number of ways.  First, 
they play a particularly powerful role in the domination and control of abused women through 
intimidation and fear and by attacking women’s self-worth and self-esteem (e.g. “I can do what I 
want to you, no one will help you, no one will believe you”).  Section 264.1(1) of the Code 
prohibits the use of threats as a mechanism for instilling fear and exercising control over the 
person threatened.  The Supreme Court of Canada described the purpose of s 264.1 in R v 
McCraw: 
 
Parliament, in creating this offence recognized that the act of threatening permits 
a person uttering the threat to use intimidation in order to achieve his or her 
                                                 
35
 Department of Justice Canada, Criminal Harassment:  A Handbook for Police and Crown Prosecutors (Ottawa: 
Minister of Justice, March 2002) at 25 [Criminal Harassment Handbook]; Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone & Kathy 
Grant, “Canada’s Criminal Harassment Provisions: A Review of the First Ten Years” (2003) 29 Queens LJ 175. 
36
 Criminal Harassment Handbook, ibid at 25; Alberta Justice Communications, Domestic Violence Handbook for 
Police and Crown Prosecutors in Alberta (Edmonton: Alberta Ministry of Justice and Solicitor General, February 
2008) at 11, 29, 70 [Alberta Domestic Violence Handbook];  OHSCO, “Domestic Violence Doesn’t Stop When You 
Go to Work: How to get Help or Support a Colleague who may Need Help” (Toronto: Occupational Health and 
Safety Council of Ontario, February 2010) at 2; Nova Scotia Domestic Violence Prevention Committee, Report of 
the Domestic Violence Prevention Committee (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, 2009) at 4. 
37
 Spousal Abuse Fact Sheet, supra note 7. 
 10
objects. The threat need not be carried out; the offence is completed when the 
threat is made. It is designed to facilitate the achievement of the goals sought by 
the issuer of the threat. A threat is a tool of intimidation which is designed to 
instill a sense of fear in its recipient. The aim and purpose of the offence is to 
protect against fear and intimidation. In enacting the section Parliament was 
moving to protect personal freedom of choice and action, a matter of 
fundamental importance to members of a democratic society.38 
 
The power of threats in abusive relationships should not be underestimated.  Abusive 
men do not necessarily use frequent physical violence to control their female partners. 
As criminologist and expert on battered women, Professor Evan Stark, notes, 
“[i]ntimidation can establish a regime of control even when the victim has not been 
assaulted…In coercive control the idea of physical harm implanted in the victim’s mind 
can have more devastating effects than actual violence”.39   
 
Research by sociologist Michael P. Johnson on “intimate terrorists” (who deploy 
violence to control their partners40) reveals that while severe physical violence and 
injury are more likely to occur and escalate in the context of intimate terrorism, this is 
                                                 
38
 R v McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72 at para 24 [McCraw]. 
39
 Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 251. A recent study on women’s perceptions of their safety 
after police intervention for domestic violence concluded:  “It is not the violence itself that causes women 
to feel in danger, but rather the meaning of the violence and the context in which the violence occurs with 
battering, lethality threats, and sexual violence holding particular meaning.” Melissa E Dichter & Richard 
J Gelles, “Women’s Perceptions of Safety and Risk Following Police Intervention for Intimate Partner 
Violence” (2012) 18 Violence Against Women 44 at 57..  Battering is defined (at 46) as “a pattern of 
violence used to gain coercive control over the victim; through violence and threats of violence, the 
batterer establishes dominance in the relationship and decreases the victim’s independence”. 
40
 Michael Johnson’s work identifies three major typologies of intimate partner violence: intimate terrorism, where 
the violent perpetrator uses violence in combination with a variety of other coercive control tactics in order to 
attempt to take general control over his partner; situational couple violence, where physical aggression does not 
involve a pattern of coercive control and which may be rooted in anger management, substance abuse, or a whole 
variety of possible dynamics and factors; and violent resistance, which is the violence engaged in by many of the 
women who are entrapped in a relationship with an intimate partner. Johnson also notes that there may be a fourth 
type of intimate partner violence, mutual violent control, which involves two partners fighting for control of each 
other, but notes that “it shows up only in very small numbers in most samples, and there is considerable controversy 
regarding its very existence.” See Michael P Johnson, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violent 
Resistance, and Situational Couple Violence  (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2008) [Johnson, Domestic 
Violence] and Michael P Johnson, “Langhinrichsen-Rolling’s Confirmation of the Feminist Analysis of Intimate 
Partner Violence: Comment on Controversies Involving Gender and Intimate Partner Violence in the United States” 
(2010) 62 Sex Roles 212 at 212-213 [Johnson, Langhinrichsen-Rolling’s Confirmation]. The arguments made in this 
article would apply to threats uttered in the context of intimate terrorism and situational couple violence, in which 
threats and psychological abuse can escalate to physical and even fatal violence.                                                                        
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not necessarily the case.41  Physical violence may not be severe or frequent.   In fact, in 
one study relied on by Johnson, 12% of women experiencing intimate terrorism had 
never been injured at all and 22% reported being physically assaulted less often than 
once a year.42  Moreover, due to the effectiveness of non-physically-violent forms of 
subjugation and intimidation of battered women, rates of physical violence and injury 
may decrease over time.43 Such a decline does not, however, make the relationship any 
less abusive or dangerous.   
 
Second, the serious role of threats in abusive relationships is revealed by their impact on 
women who may live for years in a constant state of dread and terror.  Abused women 
report that psychological abuse is often more damaging, and the effects longer lasting, 
than any physical violence, in part because of its duration and greater frequency.44  
Verbal abuse undermines self-esteem and self-worth in its victims.45 Other studies 
                                                 
41
 Johnson, Domestic Violence, ibid at 29; Johnson, Langhinrichsen-Rolling’s Confirmation, ibid;  Michael P 
Johnson and Janel M Leone, “Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings 
from the National Violence Against Women Survey” (2005) 26 Journal of Family Issues 322 at 332-334. 
42
 Johnson, Domestic Violence , ibid at 29. 
43
 Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 278, citing Minna Piispa, “Complexity of Patterns of Violence Against 
Women in Heterosexual Partnerships” (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 873.  
44
 Miriam K Ehrensaft, “Family and Relationship Predictors of Psychological and Physical Aggression” in Daniel 
O’Leary and Erica M. Woodin, eds, Psychological and Physical Aggression in Couples (Washington:  American 
Psychological Association, 2009) at 107; Roland Maiuro, “Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Names 
Will Also Hurt Me: Psychological Abuse in Domestically Violent Relationships” in K Daniel O’Leary & Roland 
Maiuro, eds, Psychological Abuse in Violent Domestic Relationships (New York: Springer Publishing, 2001) 
[Maiuro, “Preface”]; Diane R Follingstad et al, “The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically Abusive Relationships” 
(1990) 5 Journal of Family Violence 107.  
45
 Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 258-259; Johnson, Domestic Violence, supra note 40 at 41; Lisa 
Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Listening to Battered Women (Washington:  American Psychological 
Association, 2008) at 18-19.  Stark refers to women who report feeling “dead” inside; Johnson refers to 
social work professor Valerie Chang’s book, I Just Lost Myself: Psychological Abuse of Women in 
Marriage (Westport, Conn:  Preager, 1996), which bears its title due to the centrality of the loss of self-
esteem to the women survivors interviewed in the book.  A recent example in Canada is the testimony of 
Nicole Patricia Doucet, who was charged with counseling to commit the murder of her abusive husband, 
Michael Ryan.  Doucet was acquitted of these charges on the basis of the defence of duress by the Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court and Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.  A Crown appeal of these acquittals is currently 
pending before the SCC.  Doucet testified to the subjugation and loss of any sense of self.  For example, 
she testified that the reason she didn’t go to the police after Ryan’s sexual and other assaults was that:  “I 
was afraid.  I was afraid because of what he would do if I ever refused.  I just had to protect Aimee 
[Doucet’s daughter].  I had to protect myself.  You keep the peace.  If you don't disobey, you're keeping the 
peace.  You don't know what to do.  You feel helpless.  You feel worthless.  You don't even feel like a human 
being anymore, but you know that you have to do it in order to be safe” (R v Ryan, 2011 NSCA 30 at para 
21,emphasis added). 
 12
indicate that psychological abuse may be a much greater predictor of fear than physical 
abuse and may cause more emotional harm than physical abuse.46   
 
Third, while threats of death or bodily harm are in and of themselves criminal conduct 
and a form of domestic abuse (particularly when employed as a tactic of control and 
domination), there is a relationship between threats and intimidation and the escalation 
of physical abuse and femicide.  Psychological abuse (which may include threats) has 
been described as a “key predictor” of future physical abuse in intimate relationships.47  
Research also indicates that physical abuse rarely occurs in the absence of 
psychological aggression.48 Domestic violence risk assessment tools used across North 
America identify death threats, and in particular threats with a lethal weapon such as a 
gun, as a significant risk factor for intimate femicide.49 Attempts to control the 
autonomy of one's partner also increase the risk of further and potentially more 
dangerous violence. A comparative study of women killed by their intimate partners in 
                                                 
46
 Leslie Sackett & Douglas Saunders, “The Impact of Different Forms of Psychological Abuse on Battered 
Women” (1999) 14 Violence and Victims  105. 
47
 Ehrensaft, supra note 44 at 108, citing KD O’Leary, Slep Smith, & SG O’Leary,  “Multivariate Models of Men’s 
and Women’s Partner Aggression” (2007) 75 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology  752; Jacquelyn W 
White, Lex L Merril & Mary P Koss, “Predictors of Premilitary Courtship Violence in a Navy Recruit Sample” 
(2001) 16 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 910; see also K Daniel O’Leary, “Psychological Abuse:  A Variable 
Deserving Critical Attention in Domestic Violence” in K Daniel O’Leary & Roland Maiuro, eds, Psychological 
Abuse in Violent Domestic Relationships (New York:  Springer Publishing, 2001), 3-28 [O’Leary, Psychological 
Abuse]. 
48
 Maiuro, “Preface”, supra note 44 at xii; O’Leary, Psychological Abuse, ibid; Kris Henning & Lisa M Klesges, 
“Prevalence and Characteristics of Psychological Abuse Reported by Court-Involved Battered Women” (2003) 18 J 
Interpers Violence 857. 
49
 Department of Justice, Inventory of Spousal Violence Risk Assessment Tools Used in Canada (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice, 2009), citing J Campbell, Danger Assessment (2004), available online at 
<www.dangerassessement.org>; J Campbell et al, "The Danger Assessment validation of a lethality risk assessment 
instrument for intimate partner femicide" (2009) 24 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 653. See also Domestic 
Violence Death Review Committee, Death Risk Factor Coding Form, Eighth Annual Report (Ontario: Office of the 
Chief Coroner, 2010) [DVDRC] 
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the United States concluded that a “highly controlling” abuser, combined with 
separation, increased an abused woman’s risk of fatality ninefold.50   
 
Threats of death and bodily harm by intimate partners or former intimate partners, 
therefore, should not be approached as discrete acts or isolated incidents, nor 
normalized as the way a man usually speaks to his partner.  Rather, such threats should 
be understood in the context of the dynamics of abusive relationships.  As Professor 
Stark argues: 
  
The emphasis on discrete acts of violence contrasts markedly with experience-
based accounts where battered women report abuse is “ongoing”; includes a 
pattern of intimidation, isolation, and control, as well as assault; and exacts high 
levels of fear and entrapment even when violence has stopped.51 
 
An incident-specific response to domestic violence by the criminal justice system not only fails 
to recognize the cumulative nature and seriousness of a threat or series of threats in creating 
conditions of fear and entrapment for the abused woman, but also may contribute to her 
subjugation.  Stark points out that when an incident-specific approach to woman abuse is used by 
the criminal justice system (and other services providers like medical personnel), “the oppression 
battered women experience is disaggregated, trivialized, normalized, or rendered invisible…”.52 
In response to the criminal law’s focus on discrete incidents of physical violence, Stark observes 
that “because the vast majority of domestic violence involves ’minor’ assaults (e.g. pushes, 
                                                 
50
 Stark, “Commentary on Johnson”, supra note 9 at 1022-23; Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 276-277, 
citing Nancy Glass, Jennifer Magaello & Jacquelyn Campbell, “Risk for Intimate Partner Femicide in Violent 
Relationships” (2003-2004) 9 DV Report  at 1, 2, 30-33. 
51
 Stark, “Commentary on Johnson”, supra note 9 at 1020.  
52
  Evan Stark, “Rethinking Coercive Control” (2010) 15 Violence Against Women 1510 [Stark, “Rethinking 
Coercive Control”]. 
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shoves), when the law requires police and courts to view abuse through the prism of discrete acts 
of violence, woman battering is downgraded [to a less serious offence]”.53                                                              
 
Further, in the context of abusive relationships in which violence or threats of violence are used 
to create conditions of captivity (referred to in this paper as  “intimate terrorism” or “coercive 
control”), threats not only instill fear, but draw on and reinforce sexist stereotypes to control 
women and erode their sense of self-worth.   The gendered exploitation inherent in abusive 
relationships in which violence is “embedded in the context of general power and control”54 is 
lost when viewed in a disaggregated way.   A “core tactic” of coercive control is to exploit 
gendered norms to microregulate and subjugate women in their traditional sex-roles, like 
cooking, cleaning, caregiving, providing sexual services and reproduction.55  Violence or threats 
of violence are employed because the meal wasn’t good enough, the house not tidy enough or the 
woman didn’t perform “well enough” sexually. Threats may be directed at forcing women to 
comply with subjugating demands, such as sexual acts which the woman finds degrading or 
degrading rituals at mealtime.   The ultimate purpose of a threat, for example, to choke a woman 
if a meal is even five minutes late or if she answers the phone on the fourth ring instead of the 
second ring (micoregulation and entrapment), and the impact of this ongoing threat on the 
woman (captivity), is missed unless the centrality of sexual inequality to the “technology” of 
control is recognized.56                                                                                             
                                                 
53
 Stark, “Commentary on Johnson”, supra note 9 at 1019. 
54
 Ibid at 1021. 
55
 Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 210-211; Stark, “Commentary on Johnson”, supra note 9 at 1022. 
56
 Stark notes that while women and men may assault their partners in similar ways and with similar motives, he has 
“never seen a case that involved a female perpetrator of coercive control, and no such cases are documented in the 
literature.”  This is because of the centrality of sexual inequality to why and how abusive men control the woman 
they abuse.  Stark explains that “the asymmetry in coercive control reflects the asymmetric nature of sexual 
inequality” and that the particularity of coercive control includes its “focus on imposing sex stereotypes in everyday 
life”.  Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 205, 377-378. 
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Domestic abuse must be assessed like a movie, not as a snapshot.57 Focusing on isolated events 
fails to contextualize the course of conduct that can have such devastating effects on women. 
Uttering threats is often central to patterns of control and domination, sometimes enforced 
through “minor” or infrequent violence and sometimes not enforced with violence at all.  Death 
threats are not acceptable when made out of anger to a police officer, a crown counsel or other 
third party; their seriousness should not be downgraded when made to an intimate partner,                                                          
particularly given empirical evidence that threats are often used to control and subjugate.  Even 
where the abuse in a relationship cannot be characterized as “intimate terrorism”, threats are a 
risk factor for (or a predictor of) physical violence and must be treated seriously, not dismissed 
or privatized as “that’s just the way he talks to his wife/girlfriend when he gets mad”.  
 
  ii)Interpreting Section 264.1  
The Legislation: 
Section 264.1 (1) of the Code provides: 
Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, knowingly utters, conveys or causes 
any person to receive a threat 
(a) to cause death or bodily harm to any person; 
(b) to burn, destroy or damage real or personal property. 
 
Uttering threats comes under the "Assault" heading in the Criminal Code: legislative recognition 
that uttering threats is a form of assault.  This provision in its current form was first enacted in 
1985.58 Prior to 1985, the provision prohibited threats communicated by “letter, telegram, 
                                                 
57
 Elizabeth Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons From the Transcripts, manuscript on file with 
authors. 
58
 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, RS 1985, c 27, s 38. 
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telephone, cable, radio, or otherwise”.59 Prosecutions under this provision led to confusion about 
what modes of communication were to be criminalized. In R v Nabis,60 the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that “or otherwise” did not include oral threats.  The 1985 provision removed this 
limitation by clarifying that threatening “in any manner” was criminalized.61 
 
The 1985 provision required a threat to cause “serious bodily harm”.  In 1994 the requirement of 
“serious bodily harm” was changed to simply “bodily harm or death”.62  At the same time, the 
offence was changed from an indictable offence to a hybrid offence, allowing for the possibility 
of prosecution on summary conviction.63 These changes were brought in at the same time as                 
changes were made to peace bonds that aimed to make peace bonds more effective in responding 
to violence against women.64  The changes were implemented as “tools” to prevent and respond 
to domestic violence65 and were made shortly after the first criminal harassment provisions were 
enacted in 199366 in response to several high profile cases involving the harassment and murder 
of women.67 The criminal harassment provisions in s 264 explicitly require that the complainant 
be afraid, probably because the conduct involved in criminal harassment may otherwise be legal 
without the repetition and fear it induces.  The uttering threats provision in s 264.1, by contrast, 
does not require fear, presumably because the behaviour of threatening bodily harm or death is in 
itself criminal. While no explicit links were made between violence against women and the 
changes to the threatening provision, we believe that this historical context is nonetheless 
                                                 
59
 Criminal Code, 1953-54, 2-3 Eliz II, c 5. 
60
 R v Nabis, [1975] 2 SCR 485. 
61
 Criminal Law Amendment Act, supra note 58. 
62
 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1994, RS 1994, c 44 s 16, emphasis added. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 House of Commons Debates, 35th Parl, 1st Session, No 103 (4 Oct 1994) at 6521 (Hon Sue Barnes). 
65
 Ibid at 6522 (Hon Sue Barnes). 
66
 I Grant, N Bone & K Grant, supra note 34 at 1; Criminal Harassment Handbook, supra note 35 at 25.  
67
 I Grant, N Bone & K Grant, ibid. 
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significant as demonstrating a legislative intent to strengthen criminal laws dealing with violence 
against women.   
 
Both criminal harassment and uttering threats are gendered crimes in the context of intimate 
relationships. With respect to uttering specifically, a 2009 Statistics Canada Report indicates: 
Similar to patterns seen among physical and sexual assaults, female victims of 
criminal threats were more often victimized by a spouse or dating partner than 
were male victims. In particular, the proportion of females (18%) threatened by 
a spouse or ex-spouse was 6 times higher compared to their male counterparts 
(3%). The proportion of female victims threatened by a current or former 
dating partner (12%) was also about 6 times higher than for male victims (2%) 
of uttering threat offences. In contrast, males (24%) were about twice as likely 
as females (12%) to be threatened by a stranger.68 
 
The Elements of the Offence: 
At first glance, it appears simple to break down the elements of the offence in s 264.1(1)(a). The 
actus reus requires that a threat of serious bodily harm or death be uttered, conveyed or received 
by any person.  Uttering threats is not a consequence crime in the sense that it need not be shown 
that the accused caused the victim to be afraid. 69 It is well-established that whether an utterance 
is threatening is to be assessed by the reasonable objective observer. The actus reus was clearly 
described in McCraw:  
[T]o determine whether spoken or written words constitute a threat to cause 
serious bodily harm they must be looked at in the context in which they were 
spoken or written, in light of the person to whom they were addressed in the 
circumstances in which they were uttered. They should be viewed in an 
objective way and the meaning attributed to the words should be that which a 
reasonable person would give to them.70 
 
                                                 
68
 Statistics Canada, Gender Differences in Police-reported Violent Crime in Canada, 2008 by Roxan Vaillancourt 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, May 2010) at 12.  Females were victims in 73% of the criminal 
harassment crimes (at 12).  
69
 R v LeBlanc, [1989] 1 SCR 1583. 
70
 McCraw, supra  note 38 at para 42. 
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The mens rea requires that the utterance or conveyance of the threat be done knowingly. This 
element is more difficult as there are several possible interpretations of this requirement.  The 
most minimal intent requirement would be that the accused knew he was uttering the words and 
that he knew the nature of the words, i.e. the characteristics that made them threatening.71  The 
Courts have by and large taken a more restrictive approach to mens rea , although it is not clear 
that the level of intent has been conclusively determined.  The Manitoba Court of Appeal, as well 
as other trial and appellate courts across the country, concluded that s 264.1 requires an intent to 
instill fear or intimidate or an intent that the words be taken seriously.72  These three articulations 
of intent are frequently used interchangeably, despite the potentially different meanings they 
carry.73 McCraw is usually relied upon for this more restrictive interpretation of mens rea, where 
the Court spoke of an accused using threats to carry out his goal of intimidation.74   
 
                                                 
71
 Because whether words constitute a threat is a question of law (McCraw, supra note 38 at para 26), a mistake in 
this regard by the accused would be a mistake of law. This is analogous to the interpretation of “knowingly” in the 
obscenity context, where the accused need not know that the material is legally obscene if he or she knows the 
characteristics of the material that render it obscene. See R v Jorgensen, [1995] 4 SCR 55 at para 98.  A slightly 
different analogy could be made to sexual assault. The accused need not know that his nonconsensual touching is of 
a sexual nature nor that the complainant will perceive it as sexual. See R v Chase, [1987] 2 SCR 293 at para 11. 
72
 See e.g. CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 24; R v Bone, [1993] MJ No 222 (CA) at 4; R v Giancone, [2008] OJ 
No 690 (Ct Justice) at para 10; R v McRae, [2010] BCJ No 725 (SC) at para 107, which go so far as to characterize 
the mens rea as specific intent.  But to the contrary see R v Neve, [1993] AJ No 993 (CA) at para 2 which held that 
the Crown need not prove a “specific intent” to instill fear  or to intimidate, but only an intention that the words be 
taken seriously.  See also cases cited at note 74 below. 
73
 Some courts have held that the words “intent to instill fear or to intimidate” or the words “be taken seriously” are 
to be interpreted disjunctively.  See e.g. discussion in R v Fenton, [2008] AJ No439 (QB) at paras 46-55.  
74
 It is important to note that McCraw, supra note 38, never said that the offence was one of specific intent nor did 
the Court state this in R v Clemente [1994] 2 SCR 758, a case dealing directly with mens rea. Many cases, however, 
appear to import a specific intent, either explicitly (see citations, supra note 72) or implicitly suggesting that 
intoxication could negate the mens rea of uttering. See e.g, R v BKS, [2002] MJ No 543 (Prov Ct ), R v Priske, 
[1994] YJ No 67 (Terr Ct) and R v Watchmaker, [1994] AJ No.100 (Prov Ct), where intoxication was considered as 
relevant to mens rea but rejected on the facts.   See also. R v Standing, [2007] SJ No 469 (Prov Ct) and  R v Moar, 
[1995] MJ No 251 (Prov Ct) where intoxication was one of the factors that contributed to the conclusion that the 
accused did not have the mens rea for uttering. 
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Where the accused does not testify, as in O'Brien, or where we are otherwise uncertain about his 
intention, we look to his utterances to infer what he was thinking at the time.75  The Manitoba 
Court of Appeal recognized this in an earlier decision on uttering threats: 
 As was pointed out by Cory, J., in R. v. McCraw (at p. 82), "[T]he 
determination as to whether there was such a subjective intent will often 
have to be based to a large extent upon a consideration of the words used by 
the accused." Nonetheless, a trier of fact must find the accused to have had 
the subjective intent, an intent which goes beyond the mere utterance of the 
words. 
  
 Although an inference can be drawn from the words used that the accused 
intended to instill fear in someone, they must be considered in the context 
of the circumstances in which they were uttered. The specific intent to 
instill fear can only be inferred if the circumstances permit. ....76 
 
Although the reasonable meaning of his words will inevitably influence the factual determination 
of what the accused must have been thinking, the inquiry should still be focused on his 
subjective mental state.77 Our argument in the following section is not that the high level of mens 
rea is necessarily inappropriate for this offence but rather that this mens rea requirement has 
been misapplied through a blurring of the actus reus and mens rea requirements.  Some 
confusion about these elements is not surprising, given that whether the words are objectively a 
threat (actus reus) will inevitably be influenced by the trier of fact's assessment as to how the 
accused meant  the words to be perceived (mens rea). However, we argue that the consideration 
of whether the reasonable person would have found the words threatening is strictly an actus 
                                                 
75
 R v Cooper, [1993] 1 SCR 146. 
76
 R v KWB (1993), 85 Man R (2d) 220 (CA) at paras 17-18, cited with approval in CA Judgment, supra note 11 at 
para 22.  
77
 In O’Brien, after judgment was rendered, the trial judge permitted O’Brien’s father to address the Court (although 
not in the form of evidence).  The father made a plea for understanding from the Court, saying that his son suffered 
from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, had sought assistance from his First Nations band, and had effectively been 
in prison since he was 15. These statements were not tendered as evidence either of any diagnosis of FASD or as 
being relevant to O’Brien’s state of mind when he uttered the threats. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider 
how disability might affect mens rea in a case where there is evidence presented at trial that the accused did have 
such a disability.  
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reus inquiry going to the question of whether the words uttered were a threat.  It is not necessary 
to consider this in answering whether the accused knew the words he was uttering were 
threatening. The cases however, frequently lump together the elements and apply a reasonable 
person standard to both actus reus and mens rea, with detrimental consequences for women, as 
we will explain below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                         j: 
The proposition that mens rea is based on a consideration of whether a reasonable person would 
consider the words threatening demonstrates a misunderstanding of the elements of the offence.  
Objective tests relying on the reasonable person are usually applied to establish the mens rea for 
negligence offences. The mens rea for threatening is clearly not a negligence standard, as 
evidenced by the use of the word “knowingly”. The reasonable person test simply confuses the 
mens rea analysis. A careful analysis of the case law demonstrates that the role of the reasonable 
person in uttering threats is in assessing the actus reus of whether the words were a threat, not 
whether the accused meant the words to be threatening.  To determine whether he meant the 
words to be threatening, we look to the actual words and the context in which he spoke them to 
infer what he must have intended.  The test is not what other people (including the victim) 
thought about his utterances or even what a reasonable person might have thought. The test is 
whether he intended the words to intimidate or be taken seriously, not whether they were taken 
seriously.  That can best be determined from an analysis of his actions, not from the responses of 
the recipient of the threat.     
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Some of the confusion dates back to a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada's 
decision in R v McCraw.78 In McCraw, the Court had to address whether a written threat of rape 
(along with a detailed account of the sexual acts he was going to perform) sent to several women 
by the accused constituted a threat of “serious bodily harm or death”.  The trial judge held that 
this was not a threat of serious bodily harm or death, and characterized the letters as "more of an 
adoring fantasy than a threat to cause serious bodily harm”.79 He held that rape may or may not 
involve serious bodily harm but that it does not inevitably do so. The Court of Appeal overturned 
this decision, noting that the object of the threat was to create fear that serious force would be 
used if the complainants did not submit to sexual intercourse with the accused. Thus, the issue 
before the Supreme Court of Canada was the actus reus of uttering: was there a threat of serious 
bodily harm? The Court concluded that serious bodily harm was "any hurt or injury, whether 
physical or psychological, that interferes in a substantial way with the physical or psychological 
integrity, health or well-being of the complainant”.80    
 
The Court could have concluded that a threat of rape meets this definition and left it at that. But 
instead it made a number of other statements regarding the scope of s 264.1(1)(a).  First, it 
acknowledged that threats are an attempt to use intimidation to accomplish one’s objects.81 The 
threat need not be carried out; rather it is a tool of intimidation designed to instill a sense of fear 
in the recipient.82 Second, relying on its own earlier decision in R v LeBlanc,83 the Court 
concluded that it is irrelevant whether the accused actually intended to carry out the threat. 
                                                 
78
 McCraw, supra note 38. 
79
 Ibid at para 8. For a critique of the trial judge’s assessment, see Christine Boyle, “Disembodied Sexual Assault: 
McCraw v. R” (1992) 26 UBC L Rev 281 at paras 7-8.   
80
  McCraw, supra note 38 at para 23. 
81
 Ibid at para 24. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 [1989] 1 SCR 1583. 
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Rather, the criminal sanction is aimed at the intent to instill fear.84  Third, the intent to instill fear 
will be based "to a large extent upon a consideration of the words used by the accused”.85 If, for 
example, the accused did not understand the words, he may not have the necessary intent.  
 
The Court then went on to consider how to determine if particular words contravene the section. 
This is still an actus reus inquiry, i.e. the question is whether there was a threat of (then serious) 
bodily harm. This is where the reasonable person enters the equation: 
The nature of the threat must be looked at objectively; that is, as it would be by 
the ordinary reasonable person. The words which are said to constitute a threat 
must be looked at in light of various factors. They must be considered 
objectively and within the context of all the written words or conversation in 
which they occurred. As well some thought must be given to the situation of the 
recipient of the threat. 
 
The question to be resolved may be put in the following way. Looked at 
objectively, in the context of all the words written or spoken and having regard 
to the person to whom they were directed, would the questioned words convey a 
threat of serious bodily harm to a reasonable person?86 
 
At the risk of being repetitive, these words set out the test for determining whether the words 
were threatening (not an issue in O’Brien) not whether the accused meant them to be uttered as a 
threat.87 The accused's mens rea in McCraw was not at issue. Again, at the end of its judgment 
the Court sums up:  
to determine whether spoken or written words constitute a threat to cause serious 
bodily harm they must be looked at in the context in which they were spoken or 
written, in light of the person to whom they were addressed and the 
                                                 
84
 It is this language that has led some of the courts to conclude that uttering is the specific intent offence even 
though the use of "knowingly" does not always trigger such a conclusion. 
85
 McCraw, supra note 38 at para 25. Had this instruction been followed in O'Brien, the result may well have been 
different. 
86
 Ibid at paras 26-27. 
87
 As we will argue below, we do not think a reasonable person test is sufficient when dealing with a veiled threat. In 
other words, where a threat is ambiguous and has particular meaning for the person threatened, an objective 
reasonable person may not perceive the words as a threat. In that context, it is necessary to look at the circumstances 
of the relationship between the parties that demonstrate why the words spoken were threatening in the context.  
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circumstances in which they were uttered. They should be viewed in an 
objective way and the meaning attributed to the words should be that which a 
reasonable person would give to them.88 
 
The Supreme Court addressed the mens rea of s 264.1(1) in R v Clemente.89  There, the accused 
uttered a threat to his social worker that if he was transferred to another social worker, people 
would find a dead body in the second social worker's office. The Court held that mens rea was 
the intent to intimidate, or an intent that the words be taken seriously, treating these formulations 
as virtually interchangeable. In the absence of testimony from the accused, intent will be 
determined "by the words used, the context in which they were spoken, and the person to whom 
they were directed”.90  In Clemente, a case where the intended victim never heard the threat and 
could thus not have been frightened, the Court somewhat blurred the actus reus and mens rea: 
Under the present section the actus reus of the offence is the uttering of threats 
of death or serious bodily harm. The mens rea is that the words be spoken or 
written as a threat to cause death or serious bodily harm; that is, they were meant 
to intimidate or to be taken seriously. 
 
To determine if a reasonable person would consider that the words were uttered 
as a threat the court must regard them objectively, and review them in light of 
the circumstances in which they were uttered, the manner in which they were 
spoken, and the person to whom they were addressed. 
 
Obviously words spoken in jest or in such a manner that they could not be taken 
seriously could not lead a reasonable person to conclude that the words 
conveyed a threat.91 
 
The second paragraph here blurs the role of the reasonable person test – which goes to question 
of whether there was a threat – with whether the accused meant the words to be threatening.  The 
McCraw Court had made it clear that the reasonable person test went to whether the words 
                                                 
88
 McCraw, supra note 38 at para 42. 
89Supra note 74.  
90
 Ibid at para 9. 
91
 Ibid at paras 12-14 (emphasis added). 
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constituted a threat, whereas Clemente shifts that focus to whether the words were “uttered as a 
threat”, which appears to refer to mens rea, although it may not have been so intended.92  In our 
view this is what led to the confusion in O'Brien.  
 
Why does it matter whether we use reasonableness as going to mens rea or actus reus? This use 
of the objective test in assessing mens rea is problematic because in practice it has shifted the 
attention away from what the accused has done and his intent in doing so to the unpredictable 
response of the subject of his threat.  The factors we look at to infer mens rea when an accused 
does not testify, such as the manner in which he said the words, and the person to whom they 
were spoken, is about inferring what must have been going on in his head at the time he spoke 
and keeps the focus on his behaviour and his intent.  We consider the person to whom they were 
addressed, not to assess her fear (since she or he may never have heard the threats) but to 
consider why the particular person was targeted by the accused for a threat. 93   
 
The dangers of relying on the reaction of the woman who is the subject of the threat can be seen 
in the Crown’s factum on appeal to the Supreme Court. To its credit, the Crown does attempt to 
put threats in the context of domestic violence but we have some concerns about the way in 
which it does so.  The Crown factum suggests that an abused woman might not feel fear because 
the traumatic impact of abuse can blunt her responses to it.94  The Crown asserts that AW’s 
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 Ibid at para 13. 
93
 The section was correctly applied by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Tibando, [1994] OJ No 188 
(CA) where the Court held, at para 8, that there is no "room to argue on the wording of the present section 
that it must be shown that the person to whom the threat is addressed is threatened or put in fear”.   See 
also R v Armstrong, 2012 BCCA 248 at para 16 [Armstrong] where the Court of Appeal describes the 
trial judge’s decision, which correctly applied the objective test to the actus reus. 
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 R v O’Brien, [2012] SCCA No 91 (Factum of the Appellant) File No  34694 at paras 65-70; available on the 
Supreme Court of Canada website at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/factums-memoires/34694/FM010_Appellant_Her-
Majesty-the-Queen.pdf>. 
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evidence should be rejected because she was in denial of her fear as a result of Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), thus characterizing her response to the threats as unreasonable or 
pathological. The Crown’s approach is problematic in two respects. First, it shifts the legal focus 
away from the accused’s intention to instill fear to the woman who is the subject of the threat. In 
addition to being wrong doctrinally, as discussed above, it is troubling in that it makes the crime 
about the woman (the “victim”) rather than the behaviour and intention of the (male) aggressor. 
This slippage has a long (and discredited) history in the sexual assault context where women are 
disbelieved because of the perceived “inadequacy” of their resistance to male violence.95  
Second, while it is true that some battered women suffer from PTSD, others do not. This 
argument pathologizes abused women’s rational decisions to recant or refuse to co-operate in the 
prosecution of their intimate partner. In fact, an abused woman may be all too aware of the 
danger she is in and may make rational calculations about keeping herself safe.96  One significant 
reason why women refuse to co-operate is the serious risk that their testimony will lead to 
escalated coercion and violence.97  This is particularly true given that the police and the justice 
system have historically not done a good job of protecting women from further abuse.98   
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We are not suggesting that a woman’s fear is never relevant evidence in considering the elements 
of uttering threats.  In many uttering cases women testify as to how afraid they were.   In our 
view, a woman’s fear is evidence supporting the Crown’s assertion that there was a threat, i.e. 
that the actus reus is established- she is afraid because she feels threatened.  Such evidence is 
particularly important where the threat is veiled or ambiguous as discussed further below.  Her 
lack of fear, in rare cases, could be relevant to mens rea if, for example, she supported the 
suggestion that the accused was joking. As discussed below, we have found no such cases and 
find it difficult to imagine any.   What we are saying is that her fear is not an essential element of 
the offence and that, correspondingly, a lack of fear should never be determinative in deciding 
whether the accused meant his words to be intimidating or taken seriously.  A police officer may 
not feel fear if a detained individual threatens the officer’s life but this is not determinative of the 
suspect’s intent. As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R v MacDonald: 
 
it is not an essential element of the offence that the person subjected to the 
threat actually fear for his or her safety as a result of the threat. Indeed, that 
person does not even have to know that the threat was made. The reaction of 
the person threatened is of evidentiary significance only.99 
 
In the context of a threat made against a police officer, one trial judge put it even more strongly:   
"It is trite but true that whether or not the police were actually intimidated or took his threats 
seriously is irrelevant.  What is relevant is the accused intent in saying them".100  
                                                                                                                                                             
couples, and White unmarried women, even when controlling for other relevant variables”.  Finally, they note that 
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In our view, a woman’s fear or lack thereof is more relevant to whether the utterance was 
threatening than to whether the accused intended it to be.   Moreover, where, as in O’Brien, there 
is an undisputed record of what was said, where the threat is unambiguous and the accused’s 
subjective intent can be assessed from the words used repeatedly, the woman’s asserted lack of 
fear should not be necessary to establish either the actus reus or the mens rea.   
 
Re-Assessing O’Brien 
The Court of Appeal in O’Brien explicitly separates physical violence from threatened lethal 
violence, concluding that there was no foundation for determining that the complainant was 
abused, despite the accused's admission that he beat her up. The Court failed to acknowledge that 
repeated exposure to threats of death or bodily harm is abusive whether or not there is clear proof 
that he beat her up.101  We are not arguing that the Crown should have to prove abuse but rather 
that repeated threatening by a man of his intimate partner is abuse, regardless of  whether there is 
physical violence, and that the interpretation of the elements of uttering threats and the 
complainant’s testimony about the threats, must be viewed in that context. 
 
In our view, both the trial judgment and the majority of the Court of Appeal in O’Brien 
normalize repeated threats of violence in the context of intimate relationships. As Madam Justice 
Steel recognized in dissent in O’Brien, it is untenable to argue that because the accused regularly 
threatens death or bodily harm, the threats do not meet the threshold of the criminal law.  The 
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fact that a woman may have endured many threats does not negate criminal liability any more 
than it would for a complainant who, “used” to being sexually assaulted by her intimate partner, 
no longer resists. Repeating threats in most contexts is likely to be seen as inculpatory.102 There 
is no reason why the repetition of threats in an intimate relationship should serve as a mitigating 
factor.  
  
Similarly, to suggest that anger can negate the mens rea for uttering threats is inconsistent with 
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence regarding mens rea generally.103  In Parent, that Court 
held that extreme anger, on its own, could not reduce murder to manslaughter by negating mens 
rea.
104
  Extreme anger was only relevant if all the conditions of a specific defence were made out 
(such as automatism or provocation).  In R v MacDonald the Ontario Court of Appeal correctly 
characterized the accused’s anger at his wife as supporting his guilt, rather than negating it.105  In 
O’Brien, extreme anger was translated into “blowing off steam”. 
 
The “blowing off steam” analysis is highly problematic. In R v Tucker106 the accused threatened 
to kill his common-law spouse by slicing her from ear to ear. The trial judge found that the 
complainant felt intimidated and expressed fear "but she also indicated that she was not 
concerned for her safety".107 At other points in the judgment, he stressed that the complainant 
had not been afraid. In other words, she did not think he was going to slice her ear to ear. The 
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trial judge thus concluded that the accused was just blowing off steam and did not intend his 
words to be taken as intimidating.  
 
Although s 264.1 does not require threats of death, both Tucker and O'Brien involved very 
serious threats of murder. Both were spoken in extreme anger and, in O'Brien, to persuade the 
recipient to change her mind about having an abortion.  As we have established earlier, verbal 
abuse is but one form of violence used to control women in abusive relationships. It is highly 
correlated with physical violence. Characterizing death threats as “blowing off steam” or “just 
the way the accused talks” only in the context of domestic violence normalizes intimate violence.  
 
We recognize that those involved in intimate relationships argue and sometimes say things in 
anger that they do not mean.  Not all such disagreements deserve the intervention of the criminal 
law and the potential for a criminal record for the threatener.  However, the law has drawn the 
line at threats of bodily harm and death that are meant to intimidate.  We know that such threats 
in the domestic context are predictive of future violence.  If we attempt to draw a further line 
between intimate partners and others and accept that threats are permissible in the former 
context, we are essentially saying that this kind of abuse is a private, family matter that is 
unreachable by the law, an approach that has seriously disadvantaged women in the context of 
domestic violence.108                                                              
 
This paper argues that on the facts of O’Brien, AW’s evidence of lack of fear was not relevant to 
mens rea (nor would it have been relevant to the actus reus).   There may, however, be situations 
where testimony from the recipient of the threat will be necessary to prove the crime. Where 
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there is a dispute about what was said, it may be necessary to hear from the recipient of the 
threat. Where the threat is of a veiled nature, which may not appear to an objective observer to be 
threatening but when seen in the context of the relationship takes on special significance, it may 
be necessary for the complainant to explain that significance to demonstrate why otherwise 
neutral words could constitute a serious threat in the circumstances.109 For example, where there 
is a history of violence between the parties, the complainant may be aware of certain words or 
cues that signal the onset of violence even though to an objective observer those words might not 
be seen as threatening.  (“You know what will happen when we are alone”.)    
 
Further, the case law is clear that threats made “in jest” are not captured by s 264.1.  We think it 
is important to distinguish threats that were “in jest” and threats that were a result of out-of-
control anger or frustration.   We were unable to find any cases in the context of intimate partner 
violence in which the accused advanced a defence that the threat was a “joke” or made “in jest” 
and we do not find this language helpful in understanding mens rea.110  In theory, in exceptional 
cases, a complainant’s evidence might support the assertion that the accused was speaking "in 
jest” as described in the case law, however it is difficult to imagine such a case in reality and 
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difficult to imagine charges being laid in these circumstances.111 In O'Brien, there was no 
suggestion that the accused had been “kidding”.  There was a clear record of what was said, the 
words the accused used were obviously threatening, spoken in extreme anger with a raised voice, 
and intended to interfere with her reproductive freedom. The guards who heard the conversation 
were concerned enough to take action as the accused explicitly predicted they would.  In this 
respect, O'Brien could have been resolved very simply. There was no doubt about the actus reus. 
The trial judge and the Court of Appeal agreed that there was a threat of death. With respect to 
mens rea, the accused stated in the phone call "and the guards just heard me so I'll (sic) probably 
going to get charged for that" indicating that he knew his words were threatening. Instead, the 
trial judge complicated the analysis by considering whether the complainant felt frightened in 
deciding whether the accused meant to be threatening. 
 
We are concerned, too, that the judgment below was influenced by misperceptions and 
stereotypes about women who experience abuse.  In cases of threats uttered by an intimate 
partner, it is critical that the criminal justice system avoid typecasting the complainant or 
creating classes of deserving and undeserving victims.   In O’Brien, the majority of the Court of 
Appeal held that “relevant” to the context of domestic violence was the fact that AW was 
“taunting” the accused, that her tone of voice was not fearful, that she laughed during the 
conversation, and that “she responded to his words in an equally aggressive and forceful manner 
when he made the statements…”.112  That these factors are relevant to whether O’Brien intended 
his threats to intimidate or instill fear (and also to whether O’Brien may have abused AW) 
suggests a misapprehension of the dynamics of abusive relationships.   As the minority judgment 
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of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Malott emphasizes, courts must be careful not to 
perpetuate any stereotypes of abused women as 
victimized, passive, helpless, dependent”, penalizing those who do not fit into the 
“stereotypical image of the archetypal battered woman” such as those “who have 
demonstrated too much strength or initiative, women of colour, women who are 
professionals, or women who might have fought back against their abusers on 
previous occasions.113   
 
Women’s responses to abuse are varied and complex.  Women frequently use a combination of 
strategies to decrease or cope with abuse,114 which may include shows of verbal strength or even 
“violent resistance” in self-defence or as a mechanism for exercising “control in a context of no 
control”.115   The Domestic Violence Handbook for Police and Crown Prosecutors in Alberta, for 
example, lists “self-defence” and “initiating violence as a means of gaining some control” as two 
of seven “common survival or coping strategies” of abused women.116  Moreover, women’s 
responses to abuse may not appear coherent or consistent. They may resort to “subordination of 
self” (as a form of rational and “active problem-solving”)117 in some circumstances and “stand 
their ground” in others, such as reproductive choice.118  The point being threefold, that: (i) 
women who experience abuse engage a range of strategies that should not be pathologized, 
stereotyped or oversimplified; (ii) a woman’s demonstration of strength (verbal or otherwise) 
does not mean she is not subject to coercive control or abuse; and (iii) a woman’s strength or 
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resistance should not minimize or justify her partner’s threats of death or bodily harm nor be 
viewed as evidence that he didn’t really mean to control or intimidate her.  In O’Brien, AW’s 
anger or assertiveness should not affect the Court’s assessment of O’Brien’s subjective intention 
to coerce AW into one of the most significant life and health decisions any woman can make:  
having a child.   This decision can have physical, psychological, economic and other 
consequences for AW, but could also tie her to O’Brien for the rest of her life.  
 
We have argued that threats of death or bodily harm intended to intimidate and control women 
are in and of themselves a form of domestic violence and that evidence of physical violence 
should not be required before threats are taken seriously.  The context of domestic violence is not 
limited only to cases where there is a proven history of abuse.  In addition to the threat itself 
being a form of violent control, here exerted most troublingly over reproductive decision-
making, it is important to remember that abuse in intimate partner relationships can begin at any 
time.  In some cases, abuse even begins when the woman becomes pregnant119 and, as we have 
said, threats are often a precursor to and predictor of physical violence.120  While evidence of 
past violence in an intimate partner relationship can strengthen the prosecution’s case, it should 
not be necessary or determinative, except perhaps in cases involving veiled threats where the 
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history of abuse may be required to prove the actus reus.   As well, as noted above, the burden of 
adducing evidence of past abuse has detrimental implications for women who may not wish to 
testify to abuse because of fears of escalation of violence, deep feelings of shame, or difficulty 
recognizing (or believing others will recognize) that even slaps, grabs, shoves and other forms of 
“minor” violence constitute abuse.  In O’Brien it appears from the accused’s telephone statement 
that he had been physically violent toward AW.  Ultimately, however, even if there were no 
history of threats and physical assaults, the absence of prior abuse does not make a repeated 
threat to put a “bullet in the head” of a woman who intends to terminate a pregnancy any less 
serious, intimidating, controlling, or criminally culpable.   
 
4. Conclusion  
We do not know whether AW was subject to ongoing violence at the hands of the 
accused or whether O’Brien’s threats influenced her ultimate decision to carry the 
pregnancy to term. But we do know that for many Canadian women, ongoing abuse is a 
serious problem and that threats play an integral role in the coercive control of these 
women.  Any interpretation of s 264.1(1)(a) must take this tragic reality into account. 
The majority judgment in O’Brien essentially creates a new defence for those accused 
of uttering threats: the mens rea of the offence can be negated if the victim testifies that 
she did not feel threatened. This adds more pressure on women in abusive relationships 
to testify in support of their abusers, and can endanger their safety even further. Where 
there is an undisputed record of what was said and where the threat is unambiguous, the 
complainant’s asserted lack of fear should not be relevant.  We are also concerned that 
men are more likely to be given the "benefit of the doubt" on the mens rea issue in 
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domestic cases in a way that we do not see when police officers or other public officials 
are threatened.  This is particularly troubling given that police officers are generally in 
positions of considerable power over those charged with uttering threats at them while 
in custody or under arrest and handcuffed or in the back of a cruiser.  Threats directed at 
police officers by drunk offenders, while a serious matter, are not as likely to exert 
control over the behaviour of the officer.  The opposite is true in the domestic context, 
where the position of power held by abusive men goes to the heart of the reason for 
criminalizing the uttering of threats of death or bodily harm:  the abuser is using his 
position of physical, economic and social power to intimidate and control his female 
partner.   We would urge the Supreme Court of Canada to reject any disparities in 
approaches to uttering cases in light of the central role threats play in  male violence 
against women.   Threats in the domestic context require heightened, not downgraded, 
attention and concern. 
